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Lessons from the 
Bolivian crisis of 
external public 
indebtedness 
Michael D. Mortimore* 
In order to examine the decisive role played by 
transnational private banks in the Bolivian economy 
in recent years, the author considers the concept of 
external dependence . After analysing in his intro-
duction the usual meanings of this concept as re-
ferred to external vulnerability and foreign partici-
pation in the economy, he concentrates on what he 
calls 'voluntary dependence ' , where such depen-
dence is generated or increased due to the actual 
economic policy adopted by the State. 
In order to explain fully this type of external 
dependence , a conceptual framework is developed 
based on the predominant types of development 
strategies defined in accordance with their peculiar 
distribution of benefits (neocolonial, national pri-
vate and national popular) and the functions of the 
State (mediatory, infrastructural and sectoral). 
On the basis of this conceptual framework, the 
author analyses external dependence in Bolivia 
since 1952, paying special attention to the changes 
which took place in the different phases 1952-1964, 
1965-1973 and 1974-1978. In the final section he 
focuses his analysis on the internal contradictions of 
the State in the period 1974-1978 and the way in 
which these weakened its power compared with the 
transnational banks; more specifically, he examines 
the economic policy followed during these years and 
the negative effect which it had on the performance 
of publ ic enterprises, using as an example the case of 
the State petroleum company, YPFB. 
In conclusion, the author suggests that the Boli-
vian experience contains some lessons for the devel-
oping countries, especially that external financing 
on commercial terms should be considered with ex-
t reme prudence and as part of an overall rationale in 
order to avoid contributing to an increase in external 
dependence and a precipitation of political and 
economic crises. 
*The author is a member of the CEPAL/CTC Joint Unit 
of Transnational Corporations. 
I 
The general nature of the 
Bolivian crisis and the 
strategic role of the 
transnational banks* 
T h e importance of the present crisis of external 
publ ic indebtedness in Bolivia lies only in its 
magnitude as manifest in typical indicators 
such as debt service as a proportion of export 
earnings or international reserves in compar-
ison to imports, but in the fact that Bolivian 
decision-makers had put themselves in a posi-
tion where a decision by transnational banks 
(TNBs) not to refinance the Bolivian debt 
would prove fundamental to a generalized cri-
sis in the Bolivian economy. As will become 
apparent below, instead of negotiating better 
terms for its external finances on the basis of a 
much improved bargaining position with for-
eign creditors the Bolivian decision-makers 
fell victims to certain internal contradictions of 
the State, such as that between the economic 
policy of the Central Government and its im-
pact on the dominant public enterprises, which 
debili tated the State to such an extent that its 
dependence on foreign participants (primarily 
the transnational banks) became an essential 
e lement in the present crisis of external public 
indebtedness . 
As is suggested by the data presented in 
table 1, after enjoying several years of impres-
sive economic expansion in the mid-1970s the 
Bolivian economy has come to be characterized 
by all the features common to a severe crisis. 
Exports have fallen off sharply in real terms, 
and in 1980 the value of exports of goods and 
services was below that of 1970, while the rate 
*This is a preliminary report on the research projecl 
undertaken by Robert Devlin and the author on the trans-
national banks and the external finances of Bolivia. The 
main report on the research results of the project will be 
publ ished later. The author wishes to express his thanks foi 
the close collaboration provided by the members of the 
CEPAL/CTC Joint Unit, the valuable comments of Eduar 
do Gana and the criticisms of R. Sanz Guerrero and L 
Willmore, but assumes exclusive responsibility, of course 
for any error of fact or of interpretation. 
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Table 1 
BOLIVIA: INDICATORS O F T H E CRISIS 

























































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official information supplied by the Central Bank of Bolivia, the World Bank and the 
Inter-American Development Bank. 
aA new series began in 1975. 
bNo data available. 
of growth of the gross domestic product had 
fallen to an estimated real annual level of 0.3%. 
Likewise, the real decline of the level of gross 
domestic investment between 1975 and 1980 
was of the order of 50%. One could reason that 
the boom of the mid-1970s and the crisis there-
after were both related directly to external fi-
nancing or the lack of it. The boom years cor-
respond with an impressive increase in foreign 
borrowing, especially from the transnational 
banks, and the crisis years are characterized by 
a steep decline in the real rate of increase of 
public external indebtedness. Table 2 indi-
cates that during the period 1974-1978, which 
we shall later classify as a well-defined politi-
cal project, external financing was totally dom-
inated by transnational banks, which were re-
sponsible for 62% of total disbursements, 74% 
of total payments of amortization and interest 
and 71% of total net receipts from external 
Table 2 
BOLIVIA: RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE TRANSNATIONAL BANKS IN 
STATE-GUARANTEED EXTERNAL FINANCING, 1970-1979 
(Percentages) 







































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official information provided by the Central Bank of Bolivia. 
aAnnual averages. 
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sources during that period. The sharp decline the TNBs and the power of decision of the 
in net receipts during 1977 and 1978, as debt TNBs to continue financing or, in times of 
service payments gained on disbursements economic difficulties, to refinance existing 
coincides precisely with the beginning of the debt can become a matter of life or death for a 
economic and financial crisis of the Bolivian particular regime or a specific project. One 
economy. The fall in the proportion of total net need not read sinister intentions into the out-
receipts coming from transnational banks (from looks or the activities of the transnational 
65% in 1977 to - 3 1 % in 1979) was fundamental banks: all this is merely a natural consequence 
to the ensuing crisis. In effect, the transnational of the normal business practices of a private 
banks pulled the plug on Bolivia. enterprise dedicated to lending money for prof-
One may legitimately enquire wherein this it. Thus, the credit rating system employed by 
awesome power of decision on the part of TNBs TNBs to distinguish among the multitudes of 
lies and how it is acquired. The first part of credit seekers on the basis of the profitability 
this question can be answered immediately, and security of those investments simply re-
the second part forms the subject matter of this fleets the normal business considerations of 
article. The power of decision of transnational those private enterprises. Table 3 indicates that 
banks depends essentially on two factors. First, during the more recent crisis years in Bolivia, 
the loans provided by those banks must repre- using the Institutional Investor ranking as an 
sent a significant proportion of the total ex- example, that country was close to the bottom 
ternal public debt of the borrower. Second, the of the list both in Latin America and the world 
TNBs must represent the principal source of as a whole. 
new loans for that borrower. In such circum- In the case of Bolivia, this credit rating 
stances, the borrower is heavily indebted with aptly reflects the TNBs' appraisal of that coun-
Table 3 
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Source: Institutional Investor, July 1980. 
aThis credit rating reflects bankers' perceptions of each country's credit standing as of March 1980. 
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try's prospects of obtaining new loans. More-
over, the decision of most TNBs not to continue 
refinancing Bolivia's external public debt, 
which was taken most probably after a relative-
ly large refinancing package was negotiated in 
1978 with a syndicate headed by Citicorp (US$ 
155 million), was an essential ingredient in the 
failure of the 1974-1978 political project and 
the disastrous economic crisis which followed. 
In effect, Bolivia was defenceless in the 
face of this unilateral evaluation by the con-
sortium of TNBs, as may be seen from the fol-
lowing quotation: "...when Bolivia does nego-
tiate a plan with its creditors, the country will 
be forced to accept almost any refinancing 
terms that are offered."1 
The external public indebtedness of the 
Bolivian economy with the TNBs thus became 
the core element of the new dependency situa-
tion affecting that country. The explanation of 
how that dependency situation was created and 
how the TNBs acquired the awesome power to 
make decisions directly affecting the economic 
well-being of most Bolivians without the lat-
ter's effective participation in the taking of that 
decision makes up the rest of this article. 
II 
The concept of external dependence as an analytical aid and 
its utility in understanding the role of the State 
in development 
Without doubt, the concept of external depen-
dence has been one of those most often discus-
sed in the course of the analysis of the Latin 
American developmental experience. How-
ever, its use as an analytical aid to improve 
understanding of the various dependency sit-
uations affecting the developing countries has 
been on the wane. In the present article it is 
suggested that the concept of dependence not 
only continues to be appropriate for analysis of 
the relative negotiating positions of the local 
and foreign participants in the process of local 
development but actually forms a requisite for 
the detailed examination of the new situations 
of dependence affecting various countries of 
the region. 
One can distinguish at least three principal 
streams of dependency analysis. For example, 
one stream views external dependence as 
economic vulnerability of the external sector 
(Prebisch-CEPAL); a second stream sees ex-
ternal dependence in terms of the nature and 
degree of foreign participation in local devel-
opment (Furtado, Sunkel, and to a significant 
extent, Cardoso); and, of course, the Marxist 
stream considers external dependence as an 
expression of neo-imperialism (Frank and the 
CESO group of the University of Chile). Leaving 
aside the third stream of dependency thought 
because of its ideological predilections, it may 
be reasonably maintained that, in an age of 
increasingly more complex negotiations be-
tween transnational corporations and the host 
State with regard to the nature and extent of 
foreign participation in local development, the 
remaining two streams of dependency thought 
are of considerable analytical utility for public 
decision-makers. These two streams of depen-
dency thought may be considered as common 
measures of external dependence understood 
as factors which contribute to the weakening of 
the negotiating position of local entities vis-a-
vis foreign participants in local development. 
1. Some common measures: economic 
vulnerability of the external sector 
and the degree of foreign participation 
in national development 
The principal idea behind the concept of eco-
nomic vulnerability of the external (export) 
^-Institutional Investor, New York, July 1980, p. 163. 
Thus, in March 1981 Bolivia accepted without further 
negotiation the refinancing terms demanded by the con-
sortium headed by Bank of America, In accepting these 
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sector is that the fluctuations in the demand of 
the industrial countries for the primary com-
modities exported by the developing countries 
contribute to and aggravate the secular bal-
ance-of-payments problems which plague the 
peripheral economies. For example, any coun-
try may be subject to a favourable or unfa-
vourable terms of trade relationship during a 
given period, but in general terms, the more 
diverse the export items and the more disperse 
the buyers, the less vulnerable will be the ex-
porting developing country. Conversely, a 
monoproduct exporter selling in a less than 
perfect market will generally suffer prolonged 
periods of extreme economic vulnerability of 
the external sector and consequent balance-of-
payments crises. The more open an economy 
(e.g., high foreign trade coefficients) the more 
easily will the economic vulnerability of the 
export sector affect the internal pattern of 
growth and development. Although the eco-
nomic vulnerability of the export sector is not 
generally the subject of State/TNC negotia-
tions, the degree of economic vulnerability is a 
contextual factor of critical importance in State/ 
TNC negotiations over the nature and level of 
foreign participation in national development. 
Thus , an exporter enjoying a very favourable 
terms of trade relationship will have a much 
bet ter bargaining position with interested 
transnational corporations than an exporter suf-
fering from a very unfavourable terms of trade 
relationship. In sum, it is possible to measure 
with some degree of accuracy the nature and 
degree of economic vulnerability in the exter-
nal sector and relate it in an impartial manner to 
the general bargaining position of a developing 
country. No doubt this notion eould be of sig-
nificant analytical utility for policy-makers re-
sponsible for the framing and carrying out of 
State/TNC negotiations. 
The basic idea underlying the concept of 
the nature and degree of foreign participation 
in national development is that there are sever-
al relevant structural factors which directly 
affect the outcome of State/TNC negotiations 
and influence to a considerable extent the style 
harsh terms (such as an interest rate of 2.25% over LIBOR) 
the Bolivian Government wished to improve its credit-
worthiness in the eyes of the TNBs. 
of national development. The general premise 
is that the more direct the nature of foreign 
participation (e.g., direct foreign investment 
compared to technology transfer) and the greater 
the degree of foreign participation (e.g., the 
proportion of total exports or production ac-
counted for by foreign enterprises), the weaker 
and more complicated will be the bargaining 
position of the host country. The principal 
State/TNC negotiations concern, inter alia, the 
terms of entry for direct foreign investment, the 
conditions (especially the use of State guaran-
tees), for contracting external credits and the 
cost of the local utilization of foreign technolo-
gy. For the most part, one does not see with 
clarity the results of these multifarious negotia-
tions except in simplistic form, as manifest in 
the balance of payments, or in indicative form, 
as in new legislation dealing with these forms 
of foreign participation, or in very general form 
such as the data on the total amount of direct 
foreign investment, external public indebted-
ness, etc. Nevertheless, it should be evident 
that the more direct the nature and the higher 
the degree of foreign participation, the more 
complex and difficult will be any attempt on 
the part of the State to alter the existing status 
quo of foreign participation, given the plethora 
of commercial and financial relations based on 
the existing rules of the game. Obviously, for 
any government interested in reducing the ex-
plicit costs of the foreign participation in na-
tional development (e.g., profit, interest and 
royalty payments) and directing that foreign 
participation more clearly toward the priorities 
of the national plans, or otherwise increasing 
the net contribution of the foreign participants, 
a considered appreciation of the nature and 
degree of foreign participation and its relation 
to the host country's bargaining position are 
basic requirements for the latter's negotiators 
and policy-makers. 
In this manner, it is possible to measure 
with some degree of accuracy various objective 
components of a given country's dependency 
situation for the purpose of better understand-
ing the nature of its bargaining position with 
foreign participants, especially transnational 
corporations. Common measures such as the 
economic vulnerability of the external sector or 
the nature and degree of foreign participation 
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in national development can be viewed as es-
sential aspects of that endeavour. 
2. A less common measure: voluntary 
dependence stemming from internal 
contradictions of the State 
T h e task of negotiating with foreign partici-
pants falls principally on the State (which con-
sists of at least three dominant elements: the 
team of economic policy-makers associated 
with the régime in power, the bureaucracy and 
the principal public entreprises). It is quite 
possible that the State may weaken its own 
bargaining power in various ways which give 
greater influence to foreign participants than is 
warranted by existing conditions such as the 
economic vulnerability of the external sector or 
the degree of foreign participation in local de-
velopment. A clear example is that of political 
instability; in these conditions a co-ordinated 
policy vis-à-vis foreign participation cannot be 
followed and therefore foreign participants 
enjoy an improved bargaining position. A less 
clear case would be one concerning internal 
contradictions within the State apparatus 
which create circumstances whereby the State 
is incapable of or decides not to make proper 
use of the improved bargaining position that it 
may enjoy due to other factors such as a re-
duced economic vulnerability of the external 
sector or a significant reduction in the nature or 
degree of foreign participation in national de-
velopment. An example of this, which will be 
per t inent in the examination of the Bolivian 
experience, could be the case of the negative 
impact on dominant public enterprises caused 
by a given economic policy imposed by the 
team of economic policy-makers of a specific 
régime which weakens the bargaining posi-
tion of those public enterprises and leads to 
economic and financial crisis in the public 
sector. However, in order to fully comprehend 
the essence of this kind of 'voluntary' depen-
dency situation it is necessary to develop a 
suitable conceptual framework by which to 
unders tand the various roles of the State in 
national development, as well as elaborating a 
significant case study sufficient to demonstrate 
its relevance. 
It is always a very difficult task to define 
the various roles of the State, particularly in 
developing societies, and the significance of its 
economic policy in the context of the process of 
local development. The idea behind the con-
cept of the 'role of the State' is generally so 
all-embracing and extensive as to include vir-
tually any activity in any way associated with 
the State, from the political process itself to the 
provision of municipal services. In order to 
organize this amorphous mass into some kind 
of comprehensible framework it is necessary to 
simplify some of the conceptual mechanisms 
used. 
Starting from the basis that any develop-
ment strategy should in some way indicate the 
goals for the distribution of the benefits of na-
tional development, at least among the princi-
pal participants, it is possible to define at least 
three ideal-types which seem to have been 
basic to the developmental experience of the 
last 50 years. Figure 1 indicates these three 
simple strategies —neocolonial, national pri-
vate and national popular— and the corre-
sponding ideal distribution of benefits among 
the principal participants —transnational cor-
porations, the local dominant sectors (private 
and public) and the popular sectors. These hy-
pothetical ideal-type distributions of benefits 
associated with defined developmental strate-
gies demonstrate a geometric simplicity which 
can be very useful for further understanding 
the distinct orientations of the State in the 
course of national development. 
O n e can, without introducing economic 
determinism into the simplifying conceptual 
mechanism, consider the three ideal types to 
be successively prevalent orientations of de-
velopment strategy which arise in the course of 
the development process. Viewed from this 
perspective, one notes that the proportion of 
benefits considered to correspond to foreign 
participants decreases and the share going to 
the popular sectors increases in the transition 
from one ideal-type strategy to another. 
T h e part seen to relate to the local domi-
nant sectors increases in the transition from the 
orientation to the national private one and de-
clines in the shift from the national private to 
the national popular orientation of develop-
men t strategy. The local dominant sectors can 
be thought of as consisting of two components 
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Figure 1 
HYPOTHETICAL RELATION BETWEEN THE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND THE 










Neocolonial National private National popular 
Source: Adapted from Petras, J., "New Perspectives on Imperialism and Social Classes in the Periphery", Journal of 
Contemporary Asia, Vol. V, No. 5,1975. 
—private dominant groups and the State— but 
the line dividing the internal distribution of 
benefits within this category must be under-
stood in the context of local conditions and the 
specificities of the local development expe-
rience. Nonetheless, as a general rule it is 
reasonable to assume that the private dominant 
groups would predominate in the neocolonial 
orientation and the State would predominate 
under the national popular orientation. In simi-
lar fashion, these two components may be con-
sidered to be roughly equal with regard to ben-
efits for the purposes of the general case of the 
national private orientation. Thus, this simpli-
fying conceptual mechanism allows three prin-
cipal points of reference to be proposed in res-
pect of the distributional consequences of de-
velopment strategy. 
T h e neocolonial orientation of develop-
men t strategy has little relevance to contem-
porary Latin American development experi-
ences , but the other two ideal type orientations 
cont inue to have much significance for the re-
gion and capture certain fundamental aspects 
of the roles of the State in the development 
process. 
For example, a national private orientation 
of development strategy suggests that the State 
is associated with and subordidate to the politi-
cal leadership of the private dominant groups. 
T h e political project presented by those private 
dominant groups includes, in greater or lesser 
degree , some kind of association with foreign 
participants. The principal general economic 
tasks which would fall upon the State probably 
would consist of promoting private enterprise 
{local and foreign) and resisting or dissuading 
any increase in popular sector participation in 
the distribution of the benefits of development. 
Although one would expect the State to enact 
certain controls over foreign participation, es-
pecially where tensions develop between local 
and foreign participants, those controls gener-
ally can be considered subordinate to the pro-
motional task given to the State. For the most 
part, the State/TNC negotiations would consist 
of the State establishing general guidelines, in 
keeping with the priorities of the national 
plans, for increased foreign participation. 
The example of the national popular orien-
tation of development strategy suggests other 
priorities for the State, which in this case often 
assumes a significant degree of political lead-
ership based on popular electoral support, 
whi le public enterprise becomes the focus of 
its policy. With the expansion of the entrepre-
neurial role of the State, the tensions with for-
eign participants rise and become considerably 
more complicated. State controls over the na-
ture and degree of foreign participation be-
come more severe and the State/TNC negotia-
tions generally involve the direct relations be-
tween these two major participants. 
The simplifying conceptual mechanism 
thus offers certain fundamental insights into 
the role of the State in the process of develop-
134 
ment, particularly in respect of the State/TNCs 
negotiations and the general nature of foreign 
participation in national development. Oszlak, 
in a recent article,2 has identified three es-
sential roles of the State which contribute to 
this discussion and which he distinguishes in 
accordance to the principal interests served by 
the State apparatus. The 'mediatory' role of the 
State relates to the activities of the State des-
t ined to satisfy the interests of the dominant 
economic groups. The 'infrastructural' role 
consists of the activities in which the State 
operates in the common interest ofsociety. The 
'sectoral ' role of the State comprises those func-
tions and actions which serve its own interests 
as a sector apart from the others. This is no 
doubt a very simplified conceptual construct 
with labels which strike the reader as perhaps 
inappropriate, nevertheless, it does capture 
certain basic realities of the various roles of the 
State in developing societies. 
Relating these separate roles of the State to 
the simplifying conceptual mechanism dealing 
with the distributional consequences of the 
neocolonial, national private and national po-
pular orientations of developmental strategy 
provides us with the raw materials needed to 
serve as the framework for an improved under-
standing of the role of the State in the context of 
different orientations of developmental strat-
egy. 
For a régime following a neocolonial 
orientation of developmental strategy, the 
principal role of the State would be the media-
tory one in the interests of the dominant foreign 
and local participants. Historically, countries 
employing this orientation have very underde-
veloped State apparatus, particularly in respect 
of the entrepreneurial functions carried out by 
public enterprises, so that the sectoral role of 
the State is not at all important. Given the very 
unequal participation in the benefits of local 
development , the infrastructural role is not at 
all pronounced either. On the other hand, a 
régime employing a national private orienta-
tion usually expects that the growing role of the 
2Oszlak, O., "Critical approaches to the study of the 
State bureaucracy: a Latin American perspective", Inter-
national Social Science Journal (UNESCO), Vol. XXXI, 
No. 4, 1979. 
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State in local society will continue to focus on 
serving the dominant local interests (and to a 
much lesser extent foreign ones) via its media-
tory role. While this is generally the case, one 
notes however that the infrastructural and sec-
toral roles of the State increase considerably in 
keeping with the level of development of the 
country and especially in relation to the local 
process of industrialization. Thus, in the na-
tional private orientation the principal role of 
the State continues to be the mediatory one 
(although it is much reduced from the previous 
case of a neocolonial orientation), even though 
the infrastructural and sectoral roles have been 
considerably increased. Finally, in a régime 
which implements a national popular orienta-
tion of development strategy, the sectoral and 
infrastructural roles of the State are seen as 
more important than the mediatory one, al-
though the latter is never completely forgotten. 
The relative importance of the sectoral and in-
frastructural roles will depend on the particular 
features of the State apparatus (especially the 
size and nature of the dominant public enter-
prises). In this simplified fashion, one can de-
velop a conceptual framework by which to un-
derstand the dominant features of the role of 
the State in national development and the na-
tional environment for the State/TNC negotia-
tions in the context of the specific and changing 
dependency situations of individual countries. 
Returning to the discussion of the various 
measures of the concept of external depen-
dence , it is necessary to explain the signifi-
cance o í the concept of voluntary dependence 
which results from certain internal contradic-
tions of the State. For the most part, this type of 
dependency situation seems to result from a 
return to an extreme form of national private 
orientation of development strategy following 
a period in which the national popular orienta-
tion was predominant. For that reason, the 
State apparatus is usually quite extensive and 
the sectoral and infrastructural roles of the 
State well developed so that it is very difficult 
to implant the mediatory role desired by the 
new team of economic policy-makers in a bu-
reaucracy and in public enterprises accus-
tomed to relatively greater decision-making au-
tonomy, serving broader interests and, last but 
not least, receiving a greater share of the bene-
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fits of local development. In these terms, one 
can identify internal contradictions in the State 
concerning the conflicting roles played by the 
various components of the State apparatus. As 
well as having a rather negative impact on the 
general well-being of the local economy, these 
internal contradictions, in extreme cases, can 
produce situations in which the dominant 
component of the State —the team of economic 
policy-markers of the new régime— find that 
they have more in common with foreign partic-
ipants in respect of the national private orienta-
tion of development policy than they have with 
the rest of the State apparatus (particularly the 
principal public enterprises). The closer asso-
ciation of the team of economic policy-makers 
with foreign participants, which usually entails 
an easing of controls and restrictions on foreign 
participation, can lead to the State voluntarily 
ceding influence to foreign participants above 
and beyond what would normally result from 
other conditions such as economic vulnerabili-
ty of the external sector or the existing nature 
and degree of foreign participation in local de-
velopment. In sum, the State purposely re-
stricts the implementation of its available bar-
gaining strength in negotiations with- TNCs in 
order to cement the new association with for-
eign participants and the particular benefits 
which that brings to the private dominant 
groups defining the project. In this sense, the 
new dependency situation can be very conve-
nient for the dominant private participants, but 
as will become apparent in the Bolivian case 
study, in extreme circumstances it can easily 
result in profound economic and financial cri-
sis for the local economy. 
Il l 
An overview of external dependence in Bolivia, 1952-1979 
Generally the Bolivian economy can be 
thought of as a very open one in the context of 
Latin America and it has demonstrated a ten-
dency towards higher foreign trade coefficients 
in the recent period. For the most part, the 
foreign trade coefficients have been in the 30-
34% range in the 1952-1979 period, with the 
exception of the 1960-1964 period of extreme 
economic vulnerability (below 30%) and the 
1974-1978 period of exaggerated imports 
(above 34%). Figure 2 demonstrates the change 












I I I i I I I I I I I l _ l L 
1952 1960 1970 1979 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official information. 
Note: Calculated on the basis of constant values (millions of 1970 US dollars). 
*At market prices. 
**Goods and services. 
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1979 period in general and captures admirably 
the exaggerated importation which occurred in 
the period following 1974.3 
The export experience of Bolivia is indi-
cated in figure 3. This experience appears to 
consist of three separate phases: extreme eco-
nomic vulnerability (1952-1964); exceptional 
growth and diversification (1965-1976); and 
decline (1977-1979). During the phase of ex-
treme economic vulnerability of the export 
sector the country was a typical mono-product 
exporter (minerals in general and tin in par-
ticular) operating in a very imperfect market. 
Thus, when that market weakened after the 
Korean War and tin and other mineral prices 
declined sharply, the economic vulnerability 
of the export sector quickly affected the bal-
ance-of-payments position of the country and 
rapidly spread to internal economic activity. 
The export sector remained in a state of depres-
sion for more than a decade and this was re-
flected in the erratic pattern of internal growth, 
in which the 1952 value of the gross domestic 
product, in constant terms, was not surpassed 
until 1962. In effect, as is suggested in table 4, 
Bolivia was buffeted by extremely unfavour-
able terms of trade until at least 1965. 
Table 4 
BOLIVIA: TERMS OF TRADE, FIVE-YEAR AVERAGES, 1952-1979 
(1970 = 100) 
Periods 
1952-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 
Average 55.7 64.3 66.8 91.9 97.9 120.7 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official information. 
These data also clearly show that after 1965 
the Bolivian export sector enjoyed substantial 
and sustained growth based on the recovery of 
the markets for tin and other minerals and the 
diversification of exports by way of new and 
expanded exports of crude petroleum, natural 
gas and agro-industrial items. To all intents and 
purposes, economic vulnerability of the export 
sector disappeared as a constituent of the Boli-
via dependency situation and as an unfavour-
able influence on the bargaining position of the 
State, particularly after 1975 when the country 
enjoyed an especially favourable terms of trade 
situation, 
The nature and degree of foreign participa-
tion in Bolivia between 1952 and 1979 played 
an important part in the dependency situations 
3The increase in the import and export coefficients 
during the period 1953-1957 was partly the result of the 
relative decline of the real value of the gross domestic 
product. 
in which Bolivia was placed. It should be men-
tioned that for the most part these situations 
were of what has become known as classic de-
pendency, that is, extensive foreign influence 
in the export nexus between the local economy 
and the international market, and not the high 
degree of foreign participation via direct for-
eign investment in the local process of indus-
trialization which typifies what has become 
known as 'dependent development'. It should 
be noted, however, that the financial depen-
dency that characterized the Bolivian economy 
in the later 1970s is often considered to be more 
clearly related to the dependent development 
variant than that of classic dependency. These 
distinctions will become more evident with 
further elaboration of the Bolivian case study, 
particularly examination of the 1974-1978 ex-
perience. 
Viewed from the balance-of-payments 
perspective, that is, the net inflows of foreign 
capital, table 5 summarizes that aspect of for-
eign participation in local development over 
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Table 5 
BOLIVIA: NET INFLOWS OF FOREIGN CAPITAL, 1952-1978, BY FIVE-YEAR PERIODS 
(Annual averages in millions of 1970 US dollars and percentages) 
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Source: CEPAL, on the basis of information supplied by the International Monetary Fund. 
the 1952-1979 period. Measured in these 
terms, it is clear that the nature of foreign par-
ticipation has changed significantly over the 
more recent period and there have been two 
periods —1960-1964 and 1975-1978— in which 
the degree of foreign participation has been 
notably high. 
During the phase of extreme economic 
vulnerability of the external sector, 1952-1964, 
foreign participation came mainly in the form 
of official donations; the least costly form of 
foreign participation in terms of the explicit 
costs inyolved. Direct foreign investment was a 
significant, if subordinate in magnitude, ele-
ment of the foreign participation during this 
phase. In the period which followed, official 
donations declined sharply and there was proT 
nounced disinvestment by foreign partici-
pants,4 so that foreign loans became by far the 
most important form of foreign participation in 
Bolivian development. That form of participa-
tion, however, implied certain explicit costs in 
respect of commissions, amortization and in-
terest payments. In summary terms, it might be 
suggested that the increased foreign participa-
tion (via official donations) of the 1955-1964 
period was a result of the extreme economic 
vulnerability of the external sector, whereas 
that of the 1975-1978 period (via external loans) 
'The figures for direct foreign investment during the 
1965-1974 period reflect mainly the profit remittances of 
the foreign petroleum enterprise, Bolivian Gulf Co,, its 
subsequent nationalization in 1969 and disinvestment of 
the mining enterprise, Mina Matilde, in 1971. 
s temmed from the local proclivity to import to 
an extent far beyond the parameters of export 
earnings. The first form of pronounced foreign 
participation was relatively costless in finan-
cial terms (although it did provide a high de-
gree of foreign influence in the local export 
sector for the principal donor country) whereas 
the second category of participation carried 
rather onerous costs in the form of commis-
sions, amortization and interest payments. 
Turning to the role of the State in Bolivian 
development, which, as already noted, is a nec-
essary antecedent for the examination of what 
has been called "voluntary dependency" re-
sulting from the internal contradictions of the 
State, it may be said that the Bolivian case is not 
at all simple in the sense that there were con-
tinuous and constant trends in the orientation 
of development strategy. Rather, the Bolivian 
case is one of" leaps, reverses and vicissitudes. 
Nevertheless, in the context of this overview of 
the subject, it may be suggested that the Boli-
vian experience has consisted of the following 
phases; the prerevolutionary period before 
1952, which displayed a neocolonial orienta-
tion; the 1952-1964 period, which witnessed a 
j ump to a defined national popular orientation; 
the 1965-1973 period, which was characterized 
by transition and uncertainty manifest in var-
ious changes in orientation of a national private 
and national popular nature, none of which 
were very well-defined; the 1974-1978 period, 
when a well-defined orientation of the national 
private variety was implemented; and the post-
1978 period, in which transition and uncertain-
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ty have again come to characterize the orienta-
tion of development strategy. 
Before the Bolivian revolution which be-
gan in 1952 the orientation of development 
strategy may be thought of as a form of the 
neocolonial perspective, due to the fact that a 
small group of large and nominally Bolivian 
mining enterprises linked closely to the local 
landholding oligarchy monopolized the bene-
fits deriving from Bolivian development. The 
particular case of Simón Patino is illustrative 
because from that basis he created what is 
today a fully-fledged transnational corpora-
tion.5 The mediatory role was almost the only 
one undertaken by the State, although there 
were weak efforts to promote the infrastruc-
tural role of physically integrating the country, 
primarily on the basis of development assis-
tance from the United States. The excesses of 
the mediatory role implemented by the State in 
the hands of the mining companies and local 
oligarchs undoubtedly account for the revolu-
tionary initiatives which took place in the early 
1950s. 
T h e revolution brought with it a leap from 
the neocolonial to the national popular orien-
tation of development strategy, based on co-
government by the National Revolutionary 
Movement party and the Bolivian Workers' 
Central . The new orientation was manifest in 
the nationalization of the large mining compa-
nies, large-scale agrarian reform, the widening 
of popular political participation by way of 
universal suffrage and the institutionalization 
of the State and its public investment as the 
basic impulse for national development. With 
the obliteration of the power bases of the pre-
vious local dominant private groups, the do-
minant roles of the State became the infra-
structural and sectoral ones. However, the re-
volutionary chaos and the extreme economic 
vulnerability of the external sector soon 
brought this political project to the edge of 
economic and financial bankruptcy, and the 
Immediate Economic Policy Plan of the Gov-
ernment of the National Revolution issued in 
1955 became, in essence, an appeal to the 
5 See Arce, R., "Influencia ele las empresas transnacio-
nales en la minería del estaño: el caso boliviano", 
CEPAL/CTC, working paper No. 4, July 1977, pp, 21-28. 
United States Government for emergency and 
continuing economic assistance.6 The ample 
literature on the subject has demonstrated that 
although this assistance was relatively costless 
in financial terms, the foreign influence that it 
permitted caused a split between the two 
partners of the revolutionary government and 
the orientation of development strategy de-
viated in the national private direction.7 This 
was demonstrated, inter alia, by the opening 
up of the petroleum sector to transnational pe-
troleum corporations, the orientation of the 
stabilization programme of the International 
Monetary Fund implemented in 1957-1958 
and the new foreign influence introduced into 
the nationalized mining sector by way of the 
Triangular Plan. In the meantime, the fiscal 
deficit of the public sector was being met 
through external official donations. Table 6 
suggests that to the extent that the revolutiona-
ry government eased up on its propensity to 
Statism in the distribution of internal credit, it 
was able to obtain external resources for in-
vestment purposes. Nevertheless, this experi-
ence with the national popular orientation of 
development strategy resulted in tremendous 
growth and expansion of the public sector {es-
timated in 1961 to account for 45% of the na-
tional GDP 8 and the establisment of State infra-
structural and sectoral foles much in advance of 
the local process of industrialization, in spite of 
the foreign influence which accompanied the 
extreme economic vulnerability of the external 
sector during this period. 
T h e following period, 1965-1973, con-
sisted of various opposed changes or zigzags in 
the orientation of development strategy, none 
of which can be considered both clearly de-
fined and effective. This period is best charac-
terized as one of transition and uncertainty 
made up of a kind of national private orienta-
6 See Guevara Arze, W., Pian de Política Económica de 
lu Revolución Nacional, Ministerio de Relaciones Exterio-
res y Culto, La Paz, 1955. 
7 For example, Malloy, J. M. and R. S. Thorn (eds.), 
Beyond revolution: Bolivia since 1952, University of Pitts-
burgh Press, 1971; Arze Cuadros, E., La economía bolivia-
na: ordenamiento territorial y dominación externa, 1492-
1979, Ed. Los Amigos del Libro, La Paz, 1979, chapter XV. 
8Plan General de Desarrollo, Planeamiento, 3-5, La 
Paz, September 1961, introductory letter of Vicepresident 
Juan Lechín Oquendo. 
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tion dur ing 1965-1969, a pronounced but inef-
fective national popular orientation, 1969-
1971, and once again a sort of national private 
orientation implemented during the crisis 
years 1972-1973. Again, table 6 shows* basic 
aspects of these changes of orientation, as re-
flected by the sectoral placing of internal credit 
and the source of gross domestic investment. In 
many ways, the about-faces which took place 
represented reactions to the previous orienta-
tions. It should be emphasized, however, that 
the national popular orientation of the 1969-
1971 period resulted in the nationalization of 
the largest foreign enterprise in Bolivia —Boli-
vian Gulf Co.— which gave the State almost 
complete control over the local export sector (in 
association with the nationalized mining sec-
tor). Thus, although the populist project con-
ta ined in the strategy defined9 during this 
period never came to be, the public sector ex-
per ienced a noteworthy expansion, again 
above and beyond the requirements of the local 
process of industrialization. Furthermore, the 
transition from this national popular orienta-
tion to the national private one which followed 
was particularly violent and characterized by 
economic and social dislocation which re-
qui red quite a strong stabilization programme 
to establish order. The new national private 
orientation was evident in the reopening of the 
petroleum sector to private participation (this 
t ime, however, via contracts of association be-
tween the State petroleum company and for-
eign petroleum enterprises) and the new in-
ves tment law which promoted private (local 
and foreign) enterprise. In other words, the 
1965-1973 period was one of political instabili-
ty in which the orientation of development 
strategy underwent continual and opposed 
changes. Concomitantly, the various roles of 
the State went from one extreme to the other 
without clear or effective definition, and fol-
lowing the nationalization of the largest foreign 
enterprise in the country, foreign participation 
in Bolivia (except with regard to the financing 
of the nationalization) demonstrated a tenden-
cy towards decline. By and large, this period 
was one of transition and uncertainty. 
^Ministerio de Planificación y Coordinación, Estrate-
gia socio-económica del desarrollo nacional, 1971-1979, La 
Paz, 1970. 
T h e 1974-1978 period witnessed the clear 
and definite implementation of a national 
private orientation of development strategy 
which heavily favoured the private sector and 
its dominant interests. In the context of a vol-
ume of internal credit which doubled in real 
terms during this period, over three quarters of 
that credit was placed with the private sector. 
Furthermore, in spite of the fact that the coun-
try was enjoying an export boom of unprece-
dented proportions, a rapidly increasing pro-
portion of the resources destined for domestic 
investment came from external sources, reaching 
42% in 1978 (see table 6). As a consequence of 
this increased foreign participation, based on 
external loans, the external public debt of Boli-
via shot up dramatically, doubling in real terms 
between 1974 and 1978, as shown in table 7. 
Nevertheless, in spite of this clear orientation 
of development strategy and the volume of re-
sources available in the context of the export 
boom and the increase in foreign participation 
in local development, the economic situation of 
the State and, increasingly, the economy, was 
one of deepening crisis, as is suggested by the 
data in table 8. The fiscal deficit of the State and 
more generally the deteriorating state of public-
finances aptly bring out the principal factor in 
the voluntary dependency situation which led 
to the undoing of the Bolivian economy: public-
investment for private profit. However, in or-
der to understand in greater detail this par-
ticular dependency situation, it is necessary to 
focus more closely on the specific internal con-
tradictions of the State, which accompanied the 
national private orientation of development 
strategy during the 1974-1978 period. 
Before turning to that task it should be 
mentioned that since 1978 there has been a 
worsening of the crisis born of the 1974-1978 
period. Again, transition and uncertainty are 
dominant elements of public policy, most 
notably in relation to the renegotiation of the 
external public debt. The indications are, as 
was suggested by the quotation from the Ins-
titutional Investor, that the dependency situa-
tion in respect of the transnational banks is 
such that the Bolivian authorities will have to 
accept virtually any terms offered to them.1" 
10See footnote 1. 
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Table 6 
BOLIVIA: SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF INTERNAL CREDIT AND SOURCE OF 
FINANCING OF GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT, 1952-1979 
(Millions of 1970 pesos and percentages) 
Internal credit Gross domestic investment 
Year 
Current Constant Sector (%) Current Constant Source (%) 
values values11 values values3 





























































































































































































































































Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, 1980; Central Bank of Bolivia, Cuentas Nacio-
nales, 1970-1977. 
aUsing implicit deflator for GDP. 
''Preliminary ligures. 
° Es tímate. 
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Table 7 
BOLIVIA: PUBLIC EXTERNAL DEBT AND ITS SERVICING, 1974-1979 






































Source: Inter-American Development Bank, External Public Debt of the Latin American Countries, Washing-
ton, D.C., July, 1980, and information supplied by the World Bank. 
a
 Deflated by the wholesale price index of the USA. 
''Mainly transnational banks and suppliers. 
cBilateral and multilateral loans. 
<]Based on payments made, amortization payments overdue. 
Table 8 
BOLIVIA: T H E DEFICIT O F THE FISCAL SECTOR, 1974-1979 
(Millions of 1970 pesos and percentages) 
Year Fiscal deficit 
Deficit 
































Source: Central Bank of Bolivia, Cuentas Nacionales, 1970-1977, and Boletín Estadístico, No. 237. 
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IV 
A short examination of the internal contradictions of the 
State which derive from the national private 
orientation, 1974-1978 
1. The general situation 
One of the anomalies of the experience with 
the national private orientation during the 
1974-1978 period is that the financial crisis in 
the public sector came hard on the heels of the 
most notable export boom in modern Bolivian 
history, despite the fact that the State exercised 
almost complete direct control over the major 
export items (mineral concentrates and metals, 
and crude petroleum and natural gas) through 
the main public enterprises COMIBOL, ENAF 
and YPFB. Table 9 demonstrates that during 
the 1974-1978 period, public sector fiscal in-
come was to a very high degree {57-69% of total 
fiscal receipts) generated by the external sec-
tor, particularly the export sector. How then, 
should one interpret the resulting crisis which 
coincided with the vastly increased economic 
potential of the State? 
Without doubt, one important factor in-
volved was the false expectations generated by 
the export boom. Evidently, the team of deci-
sion-makers associated with the central gov-
ernment believed that the export boom pro-
vided a self-sustaining basis for contracting 
external loans, as did the transnational banks, 
which provided the major part of that external 
financing. It seems, however, that the latter 
were quicker to spot the artificial basis of the 
country's economic policy, that is, they real-
ized that the export boom was mostly based on 
a favourable price effect that simultaneously af-
fected most Bolivian export items. Indeed, the 
physical volume of most export items did not 
increase, and several even experienced a de-
cline, especially after 1977. Thus, one could 
conclude that the increase in external financing 
was based on a false export perspective and 
that, when those expectations did not develop, 
the export earnings received were not enough 
to sustain the dimension of external public in-
debtedness already contracted. However, as 
will be explained later, the decline in Bolivian 
export performance was not, in fact, primarily a 
result of bad luck, it was largely a direct conse-
quence of the general economic policy fol-
lowed during this period. 
On the one hand, the decline in the real 
value of export earnings can be associated with 
the level to which the Bolivian peso was over-
valued. Table 10 makes a rough estimate of the 
extent of that overvaluation —between 25 and 
37% during the 1974-1978 period— using the 
68% devaluation in 1972 as the basis for parity. 
Undoubtedly, the overvaluation of the peso 
served as a consequential disincentive for local 
exports, most of which were generated by the 
local public sector. Moreover, the ability to 
maintain the exchange rate in that state of over-
valuation resulted in good part from the level of 
net receipts from external financing, and be-
cause of a reduction in that external financing 
there was a 25% devaluation of the peso in 
November 1979. 
On the other hand, the team of economic 
policy-makers followed an explicit policy of 
financial drainage of the dominant public en-
terprises. Table 11 illustrates this aspect of 
local economic policy. In essence, the export 
boom was channelled through the dominant 
public enterprises to the National Treasury 
(where the lion's share was further directed to 
the private sector). Furthermore, the rate of 
taxation of these public enterprises exceeded 
their rate of return from export activities, as 
measured by the indices of table 11. Obviously, 
this degree of financial drainage of the prin-
cipal export enterprises explains a significant 
part of the poor export performance which 
resulted. 
Finally, because of this financial drainage 
and the placing of about three-quarters of all 
internal credit in the private sector, the major 
public enterprises were forced to rely on exter-
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Table 9 
BOLIVIA: RELATION BETWEEN THE FISCAL RECEIPTS OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT" 
AND THE EXTERNAL SECTOR, 1964-1979 




































































































































































































Source: Central Bank of Bolivia, Boletín Estadístico, various numbers. 
a Measured by the current receipts of the National Treasury. 
b
 Applied to mainly export activities. 
Table 10 
BOLIVIA: APPARENT PURCHASING POWER OF THE PESO, 1973-1979 




































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of IMF data. 
"Using implicit GDP deflator. 
kWhoIesafe prices. 
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Table 11 
BOLIVIA: TAX AND ROYALTY PAYMENTS TO THE NATIONAL TREASURY BY THE 
PRINCIPAL EXPORTING PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND COMPARISON WITH 
THE EXPORT EXPERIENCE, 1971-1978 








































Source: Calculated on the basis of information from the Dirección General del Presupuesto of the central government. 
Note: Excludes royalty payments to regional authorities and taxes on local sales. 
^Annual average. 
nal financing for their investment programmes. 
Table 12 shows how the main public enter-
prises in the productive sector became depen-
dent on external financing, almost all of it from 
transnational banks. The figures for total credit 
to public enterprises in the productive sector 
are almost identical with those for total external 
financing from transnational banks. Further-
more, although these public enterprises 
received only 38% of the total net receipts from 
external financing during the 1974-1978 
period, they were the recipients of over 68% of 
loans from the transnational banks. In other 
words, 'productive' public investment was, to a 
very significant degree, financed by foreign 
participants, namely the transnational banks. 
In the context of national economic policy, 
which militated against the continued solvency 
of these productive public enterprises, particu-
larly the major exporters, a decision by 
transnational banks not to refinance the 
growing public external debt of these enter-
prises meant the collapse of most public invest-
ment programmes in the productive sector,11 
and in an economy like that of Bolivia, where 
^ T h e effect of the external financing, by transnational 
banks, of public investment in the services and other 
sectors will not be dealt with in this article. This aspect 
will, however, receive explicit treatment in the larger 
document currently in preparation. 
the public sector is such an important part of 
local economic activity and is almost the sole 
major exporter, the collapse of the programme 
of public investment signals oncoming crisis. 
Until this state of affairs went to such an 
extreme that it called into question the sol-
vency of the public enterprises in particular, 
and the economy as a whole, this form of volun-
tary dependency was quite convenient for all 
the main participants. The State completed its 
mediatory role in relation to the dominant pri-
vate groups and the foreign participants by 
channell ing the gains from the export boom 
to private groups (local and foreign). The 
transnational banks, in an epoch of surplus 
funds associated with the recycling of 
petrodollars, were happy to make loans to the 
major public enterprises on the basis of a 
guarantee from the central government. Fur-
thermore, the rates of interest charged, not to 
mention the fat commissions, made for very 
good business. The local dominant private 
groups enjoyed unheard-of levels of internal 
credit and had plentiful foreign currency 
available to satisfy their desires to import. Last, 
but by no means least, the State enterprises 
were able to advance their infrastructural and 
sectoral roles, in the short term, on the basis of 
external financing. In the beginning, then, the 
new system of public investment for private 
profit associated with the clearly defined 
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national private orientation of development 
strategy applied in the period 1974-1978 
seemed to work well in spite of the fact that it 
created a kind of voluntary dependence on the 
transnational banks. 
Unfortunately, the new system was pushed 
to an extreme and the internal contradictions of 
the State laid the basis for its subsequent 
collapse. First, a significant element of the 
local dominant private groups took unfair ad-
vantage of the new focus of public policy. 
Increasingly, internal credit in the private 
sector was directed to non-productive ends and 
the accelerated importation came to reflect 
conspicuous consumption. Figure 4 shows that 
private investment in fixed assets declined 
steeply after 1975. It was public investment 
which fuelled the economy thereafter. In this 
way, the private sector registered its lack of 
confidence in the prevailing economic scheme. 
Cases of misuse of public credit by the private 
sector, such as that of the loans of the Agricul-
tural Bank to the cotton growers of the Santa 
Cruz region, became common. Furthermore, 
the flight of capital (reaching US$ 33 million 
in 1977 in constant 1970 values) reflected the 
lack of faith of the private sector in this particu-
lar national private orientation of development 
strategy. In short, the private sector declined 
the opportunity of becoming the motor of 
Bolivian development. Second, the effect of 
the national economic policy on the dominant 
Table 12 
BOLIVIA: NET INFLOW OF EXTERNAL FINANCING8 BY RECIPIENTS, 1974-1978; 
OVERALL TOTAL AND TOTAL FROM TRANSNATIONAL BANKS 
(Millions of 1970 US dollars and percentages)1' 
Recipient 
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Source: Calculated from official information provided by the Central Bank of Bolivia. 
Note: These figures have been adjusted to distribute to the corresponding public enterprises the credits 
contracted on their part by the central government. Only the largest loans (US$ 155,0, 37.0, 25,0, 13.5 and 10.0 
millions), which add up to U3$ 240.5 millions, were distributed in this manner. 
"With guarantee of State. 
Deflated by wholesale price index of USA. 
°PEPS: Public enterprises of productive sector. 
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Figure 4 
BOLIVIA: DOMESTIC INVESTMENT 
IN FIXED ASSETS, BY SECTOR, 
1973-1978 





Source: Banco Central de Bolivia, Cuentas Nacionales, 
1970-1977, La Paz, 1980. 
publ ic enterprises soon contributed signifi-
cantly to the termination of the export boom as 
well as the decapitalization and consequent 
economic and financial crisis of those enter-
prises. In these unfavourable circumstances, 
the transnational banks soon decided not to 
continue financing the investment programme 
of those enterprises or refinance their existing 
external public debt. In this fashion, the inter-
nal contradictions of the State, in circum-
stances of voluntary dependence, resulted in a 
generalized crisis: one in which the foreign 
participants held the decision-making power to 
de termine the extent of local suffering as a 
consequence of the terms and conditions that 
these transnational banks demanded as part of 
the necessary refinancing package. 
This, then, is the general situation whereby 
the internal contradictions of the State 
produced crisis and the transnational banks 
acquired an awesome power of decision-
making with regard to the intensity and dura-
tion of that crisis. Analysis of a particular 
example of the internal contradictions of the 
State and the specific dependency situation of a 
dominant public enterprise will further illus-
trate this analysis of the general situation. We 
will therefore take the very well-known case of 
the State petroleum company, for the obvious 
reason that, more than other public enterprises, 
it would seem highly improbable that a State 
petroleum company of a petroleum exporting 
country could be brought close to bankruptcy 
precisely at the time of the OPEC initiatives. 
2. The revealing case of the State petroleum 
company, YPFB 
One of the serious problems faced by the State 
petroleum company during the 1970s was the 
steep decline in crude petroleum reserves in 
the face of increasing local consumption. A sig-
nificant portion of overall export earnings came 
from exports of natural gas to Argentina, but the 
growth in the value of these exports could not 
keep pace with the fall in the value of exports of 
crude petroleum. In spite of the fact that this 
depletion of natural resources put a constraint 
on the operations of the public enterprise, 
however, it was by no means the principal 
cause of the financial crisis which the enter-
prise experienced in the later 1970s. 
The principal causes of that crisis are to 
be found in the national economic policy which 
affected in notably negative fashion the 
operation of the enterprise, whose financial 
drainage went far beyond the parameters of the 
export boom in crude petroleum and natural 
gas (see table 13). In the context of declining 
exports, payments of taxes and royalties as a 
proportion of the value of export sales in-
creased from 57 to 70% between 1974 and 1978, 
while measured as a proportion of net profits 
they went from 149 to 1 015% over the same 
period. This accelerated financial drainage of 
the State petroleum enterprise soon surpassed 
its ability to pay that level of taxation and 
royalties, and it fell behind in its payments as of 
1975. The reaction of the team of economic 
policy-makers of the central government was 
rather novel, if disastrous for YPFB, for what 
happened was that the Central Bank contracted 
external credits (on very expensive terms), 
used the receipts to cancel YPFB's overdue tax 
and royalty payments, and charged the debt to 
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Table 13 
BOLIVIA: FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE OPERATION OF THE STATE 
PETROLEUM ENTERPRISE, YPFB, 1971-1978 
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5. Total debt 
Long term 
Short term 
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gross sales 
3. Taxes and 
royalties/ 
exports 
4. Net profits/ 
taxes and 
royalties 
5. Fixed assets/ 
total assets 
6. Short term debt/ 
total 


































































































































Source: YPFB, Memoria anual, various years. 
the State petroleum company. Thus, a public 
enterprise which already could not meet the 
burden of the accelerated financial drainage in 
process was expected to generate additional 
resources for the payment of interest and amor-
tization on loans in the order of US$ 17-26 
million per annum (see table 14). 
In this difficult financial situation, the 
State petroleum company had very little room 
for independent action. It was still paying 
Table 14 
BOLIVIA: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL DEBT OF YPFB, 1978-1979 
(Millions of current dollars) 
Source of 
financing 
1. External financing 
(a) Transnational banks 
( 1) New York State C.R. Fund 
(2) Bank of America3 
(3) Anthony Gibbs & Sons3 
(4) Deltec Bank Corporation 
(5) Bank of America3 
(6) Citicorp3 
(7) Texas Commerce Bank* 
(8) Arlábante 
(9) Texas Commerce Bank 









(7) Worthington Pump 
(8) Cie. Générales Géophysique 
(9) Sismograph Service 
2. Internal financing 
(a) Central Bank of Bolivia 





(6) BCB (IMF) 
(7) BCB 
(b) Others 
(1) Comité Obras Públicas Chuq. 
(2) US AID Bolivia 




















































































































































































Gasduct Sta. Cruz-Yacuiba 
Expansion of Cochabamba refinery 
SCZ and CCB refineries, lubricants 
Working capital 
Pipeline Tita-Sta. Cruz 
Refineries 
Expansion of gasduct Sta. Cruz-Yacuiba 
Exploration and development fields 
Rotating credit for materials 
Expansion of refineries 
Rotating credit for materials 
Gasduct Monteagudo-Sucre 
Compensation of Gulf Boliviana 
Gasduct Sta. Cruz-Yacuiba 
Gasduct Sta. Cruz-Yacuiba 
Expansion of Cochabamba refinery 
Technical assistance 
Pumps and panels 
Seismic surveys 
Seismic surveys 
For payment of overdue taxes 
Refineries 
For payment of overdue taxes 
For payment of overdue taxes 
For payment of overdue taxes 
For payment of overdue taxes 
Purchase of aircraft for President 
Gasduct Monteagudo-Sucre 
Acquisition of materials 








Source: YPFB, Estado de la deuda, 1978 and 1979. 
^Syndicated loan. 
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the indemnization of Bolivian Gulf Co. which, 
according to the agreement of 1972, meant 
that the export earnings from the fields 
corresponding to the ex-Gulf operations 
(50-54% of total production during this period) 
were channelled into a fiduciary fund ad-
ministered by the First National City Bank.12 
This had the effect of removing from YPFB's 
control a major element of its operations. 
Another agreement in 1975, this time admin-
istered by the Bank of America Trust and 
Saving Association of San Francisco, removed 
from YPFB's hands virtually the rest of its 
c rude petroleum export earnings, which were 
he ld in trust for payment of external loans 
contracted for the purpose of building and 
expanding local refineries. Thus, until those 
projects were operating and generating re-
turns, YPFB was extremely short of funds. On 
top of this, YPFB was expected to subsidize 
local consumption of petroleum and its deriva-
tives. YPFB has estimated that the cost of these 
subsidies reached a value equivalent to 786 
million 1970 pesos, or 12% of total sales of 
the enterprise between 1974 and 1978.13 The 
accelerated financial drainage of the public 
enterprise via tax and royalty payments, the 
earmarked export earnings and the subsi-
dization of local consumption were all aspects 
of national economic policy which forced the 
State petroleum company to undertake a rather 
pronounced mediatory role in its activities in 
the petroleum sector. 
At the same time, indicative of the internal 
contradictions of the State which derived from 
this public enterprise, it launched a large pub-
lic investment programme for the construction 
and expansion of local refineries. This can be 
interpreted as an expression of the sectoral role 
of the State played by this public enterprise, a 
role which was in total contradiction with the 
mediatory one implanted in the operations of 
that enterprise. In order to undertake this rath-
er large investment programme, YPFB had to 
contract external credits guaranteed by the 
Central Bank, mainly with the transnational 
banks. As is made clear by table 14, as well as 
introducing further external dependency into 
the operations of YPFB, the terms of the new 
loans completely changed the structure (and 
most of all, the cost) of that enterprise's existing 
debt, most of which had come from multilateral 
institutions on concessionary terms. Needless 
to say, in a short period of time this public 
enterprise was on the verge of bankruptcy and 
the transnational banks were reluctant to re-
finance outstanding loans held in the Central 
Bank. 
One might add that in the midst of the 
financial chaos which resulted from the inter-
nal contradictions of the roles of the State re-
lating to the YPFB operations, the infrastruc-
tural role of the State, which in this case would 
presumably relate to the exploration for and 
development of new petroleum reserves, 
seems to have been completely overlooked, to 
the detr iment of the process of national devel-
opment . 
V 
Conclusions: Lessons from the Bolivian experience 
Obviously, this unfortunate experience for 
Bolivia offers some lessons for developing 
countries hoping to avoid a repetition of the 
dangers of the Bolivian crisis. Firstly, it is evi-
l 2For details of this agreement and that of 1975, see 
YPFB, Memoria anual, 1978, p. 49. 
1 3See information presented in YPFB, Gestión, 1978, 
D.22. 
dent that the transnational banks are profit-ma-
king commercial institutions which have con-
siderable power and influence available to 
achieve their goals. This power and influence 
considerably affects the results of their negotia-
tions with their clients, especially in the devel-
oping countries, as regards: (i) the possibility of 
obtaining external credit from the transnational 
banks; and (ii) its cost to the recipient country. 
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A country without creditworthiness in the view 
of the transnational banks will simply not be 
able to obtain external credits, while a country 
with low creditworthiness will be able to ob-
tain funds, but at a cost which does not perhaps 
reflect the real situation of the country. In the 
second place, it is obvious that a developing 
country must negotiate the conditions of its ex-
ternal public debt if it wants to avoid falling 
into new dependency situations which create 
greater external influence and consequent 
weakening of national decision-making power. 
In this sense, a government must negotiate 
with transnational banks in order to contract 
external financing on terms appropriate to its 
economy. In order to be able to carry out these 
negotiations, government negotiators must 
possess an explicit and concrete understanding 
of the relative dependency situations which 
affect their country and their bargaining posi-
tion vis-à-vis the transnational banks. These 
considerations should govern not only the 
terms and conditions negotiated but the abso-
lute level of external public indebtedness. For 
these purposes, a national system for co-ordina-
ting negotiations, limiting the use of State gua-
rantees and recording contractual obligations is 
a fundamental and essential prerequisite. 
Thirdly, the internal contradictions evident in 
the State only serve to weaken its bargaining 
position compared with that of the foreign par-
ticipants. The Bolivian experience clearly 
demonstrates that external financing on com-
mercial terms, even in times of an export boom, 
cannot serve as a means ofeither overcoming or 
avoiding these internal contradictions. The 
more a given State makes use of this expensive 
form of external financing, the greater in gen-
eral will be the external influence it creates. 
Sooner or later, depending on the extent of 
these internal contradictions, the negative re-
percussions of this kind of voluntary depen-
dency will be felt in the economy and in soci-
ety, especially in the relative bargaining posi-
tion of the State during its negotiations with 
foreign participants such as transnational 
banks. 
Fourthy, foreign loans on commercial 
terms should be contracted only for those pub-
lic enterprises and those specific projects 
which are capable of meeting these terms. Or, 
conversely, if the economic policy does not en-
able the public enterprise to function accord-
ing to commercial norms, as was the case with 
the Bolivian State petroleum company, YPFB, 
external financing should be limited to that 
available on similar terms to those offered by 
multilateral institutions. 
